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Abstract
Prior studies have found that subjects prefer an improving sequence of income over a
constant sequence, even if the constant sequence o¤ers a larger present discounted value.
However, little is known about how these preferences vary with the size of the wage pay-
ments. In each of our three studies, we nd a relationship between the preference for
increasing payments and the size of the payments. Further, our measure of the shape of
the utility curve is not signicantly related to this behavior. Our results roughly con-
rm an earlier theoretical prediction that the preference for increasing wage payments will
be largest for payments which are neither very likely nor very unlikely to cover the cost
of e¤ort. Finally, consistent with the literature, we nd mixed evidence regarding the
applicability of these time preferences in domains other than money.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that in experimental settings, subjects can make choices which are consistent
with a preference for increasing payments (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991). In particular,
many people prefer an increasing sequence of payments over a constant sequence, even if
the increasing sequence has a lower present value. However, little is known about how this
preference varies with the scale of the income payments. Additionally, little is known about
the preference over sequences of nonmonetary aspects of a job. To address these issues, we
elicit preferences over sequences of wage payments and other employment characteristics.
In each of the studies which follow, we ask subjects for their preferences over sequences of
payments. In these payment questions, each response item species payment in a particular
year, where each sum to an identical amount. However, the response items vary in their rate
of increase. We always o¤er a constant payment sequence and various increasing sequences,
where the rate of increase is negatively related to the present value of that sequence. Therefore,
the rate of increase in the chosen payment sequence is a measure of the strength of the
preference for increasing payments.
We nd that the preference for increasing income is increasing in the size of the income
payments. We nd that this choice is unrelated to our measure of the shape of the utility
function. And consistent with the prediction made in Smith (2009a), we nd that the pref-
erence for increasing wages is strongest for intermediate wages. In particular, we nd that
the di¤erence between the preference for increasing sequences of money from wages and the
preference for increasing sequences of nonwage money is greatest for intermediate values.
In Study 1, we elicit preferences for undergraduate economics students regarding income
payment streams and hours required for a job. We nd that the preference for increasing
sequences of income is stronger when the payments are larger. We also nd that subjects
whose preference for increasing income varies with income also tend to have a relationship
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between the preference for decreasing hours and the amount of hours required.
However, in Study 1 we cannot distinguish between the preference for sequences of nonwage
payments and the preference for sequences of income, which as Loewenstein and Sicherman
(1991) have determined, can be di¤erent. Therefore, in Study 2 we elicit preferences for se-
quences of money from undergraduate and graduate psychology students, where the payments
are from two possible sources. In one treatment, we describe the payments as income from
wages. In the other treatment, we describe the payments as money sent by a relative who
has won a lotto jackpot. We nd that the di¤erence between the two treatments is largest
for intermediate payments. This nding roughly conrms the results in Smith (2009a), which
predicts that the preference for increasing payments of income will be largest for payments
which are neither very likely nor unlikely to cover the cost of e¤ort, namely intermediate
payments.
A possible explanation for the relationship between the degree of the preference for increas-
ing payments and the size of the payments is that it is due to decreasing marginal utility of
money. In order to test this possible explanation, in Study 3 we also measure the shape of the
utility of money for our law student subjects. Specically, we employ an Eckel and Grossman
(2008) type measure of risk aversion. While we again nd that the preference for increasing
payments is related to the size of the payment, we nd that this behavior is not related to our
measure of the utility function. Further, unlike Study 1 we do not nd agreement between
the relationship between improving sequences and the values of the sequences in the domains
of money and required hours.
2 Related Literature
Research has found that people have a preference for improving sequences of outcomes. This
extensive body of research extends to monetary outcomes or nonmonetary outcomes, ret-
rospective evaluations or prospective evaluations, and short or long time horizons.1 For
1For instance, see Ariely and Carmon (2000), Chapman (1996a, 1996b, 2000), Chapman and Elstein (1995),
Elster and Loewenstein (1992), Gigliotti and Sopher (1997), Guyse et. al. (2002), Hsee et. al. (1991), Hsee
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instance, Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) o¤ered subjects a choice among payment pro-
les over 6 years. The payments within each payment prole summed to identical amounts
however each varied the rate at which the payments were made. The choices included con-
stant, decreasing, and increasing choices. Therefore, any subject with a positive discount
rate should never prefer an increasing prole. Despite this, the authors found that many
subjects preferred increasing payments. Additionally, the preference for increasing payments
was particularly pronounced when the payments were described as "income from wages" as
opposed to "income from rent." In our experiment, we deviate from the "income from rent"
baseline measure because if the subject has prosocial preferences, the subject might not want
to obtain an improving sequence of money by imposing a declining sequence on the person
paying the rent. Therefore, in Study 2 we measure the baseline preference for increasing
payments by describing the money as resulting from a large lotto jackpot won by a family
member.
One goal of this paper, is to test the predictions of Smith (2009a). The paper models
a decision maker who selects among prospective sequences of income payments where the
decision maker has imperfect recall of the cost of e¤ort. The decision maker exhibits a
preference for increasing payments and this e¤ect is strongest when the payments are neither
very likely nor very unlikely to cover the cost of e¤ort. In other words, the paper predicts that
the preference for increasing payments will be strongest for intermediate payments. The most
clear evidence of this is found in Study 2 where we nd that the largest di¤erence between
preference for increasing sequences of wages and the preference for increasing sequences of
nonwage payments occurs for intermediate payments.
Of course, we are eliciting preferences over objects which di¤er in the timing and amount of
money to be received. When observing such choices, it is not a trivial problem to distinguish
the e¤ects due to the instantaneous preferences for money and that due to time preferences.2
and Abelson (1991), Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), Matsumoto et. al. (2000), Ross and Simonson (1991),
Soman (2003) and Varey and Kahneman (1992).
2See Issler and Piqueira (2000), Warner and Pleeter (2001), Andersen et. al. (2008) for e¤orts in this
regard.
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Eckel and Grossman (2008)3 o¤er a simple measure the risk aversion of a subject. In the Eckel-
Grossman measure, the subject selects one out of 5 possible gambles whereby riskier gambles
o¤er a higher expected value. The response allows the experimenter to obtain a measure of
the Constant Relative Risk Aversion parameter of the subject. We employ a variation of the
Eckel-Grossman measure and compare the results to the preference for increasing sequences
of money and decreasing hours.
There is a literature which seeks to establish a relationship between the size a monetary
payment, the delay in which it is received and the subjects time preference. In particular,
Green et. al. (1997) o¤ered subjects a choice between single payment options and found a
negative relationship between the discount rate and the amount of the payment.4 We perform
a similar exercise in the sense that we wish to learn how the subjects time preferences (or
negative time preference in our case) varies with the size of the payments. However, to
our knowledge, there has been no study which examines such an e¤ect on the preference for
sequences of payments.
Prior research has examined whether time preferences in one domain (say money) is related
to time preferences in another domain (say health). The existing evidence on this matter is
mixed. Early literature found that the preference for sequences can be independent of the
domain of the sequence (Chapman, 1996a, 1996b). However, more recent papers nd a similar
time preference across domains (Chapman, 2002; Chapman and Weber, 2006; Hardisty and
Weber, 2009). Also to our knowledge, Schoenfelder and Hantula (2003) is the only paper to
explore the issue of time preferences over job attributes in di¤erent domains. Schoenfelder
and Hantula do not nd a relationship between the time preference for income and the time
preference for the percentage of the job engaged in preferred tasks. Consistent with the
literature, we also nd mixed results on the matter. In Study 1 we nd that the undergraduate
economics subjects which exhibit a relationship between the preference for increasing payments
3See Holt and Laury (2002) for another such measure and Dave et. al. (2007) for an examination of the
merits of both.
4Also see Benzion et. al. (1989), Green et. al. (2005), Raineri and Rachlin (1993), Smith and Hantula
(2008), Stevenson (1993) and Thaler (1981).
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and the size of the payments also exhibit a relationship between the preference for decreasing
hours and the number of hours required. In Study 3 we nd no such relationship with our
law student subjects.
There are two primary criticisms of the literature cited above. The rst criticism is that
the evidence supporting the existence of the preference for increasing payments tends not to
be robust to the method of elicitation. The second criticism is that the responses of the
subjects are not incentive compatible and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) show that the preference for increasing sequences is
somewhat sensitive to the means of elicitation.5 We attempt to mitigate these spurious
e¤ects. The authors list three reasons6 regarding which a subject might exhibit a preference
for increasing sequences: the utility of anticipating future outcomes, a contrast e¤ect by
having a series of improvements according to a reference point, and an extrapolation e¤ect
where subjects come to believe that the payment trajectory will continue beyond that specied
by the experimenter. We view the rst two of these to be valid reasons to prefer improving
sequences, however we view the nal reason to be an unwanted remanent of the methodology.
Therefore, we design the experiment to mitigate the extrapolation e¤ect by explicitly stating
that prospects beyond a certain year are identical.7 For instance, the income questions state
that the subject will either be promoted or red and therefore the answers to the questions
will not a¤ect outcomes beyond the period specied.
There is a criticism that the experimental work is largely not incentive compatible. (It
is after all relatively di¢ cult and expensive to experimentally manipulate a persons income
payment schedule.) Nonetheless, there is evidence that data generated by such experiments
is useful. For instance, Johnson and Bickel (2002) nd no signicant di¤erences between
5See Gigliotti and Sopher (2004) for a paper which challenges the robustness of the preference for increasing
payments. Also see Manzini et. al. (2006) for "mixed" evidence on the topic.
6Also see Read and Powell (2002) for more on the reasons which underpin decisions over time.
7We mention the motivations given by Frederick and Loewenstein for preferences for constant or diminishing
sequences. Regarding a preference for constant sequences: diminishing marginal utility, equality among "selves"
and "divide equally" heuristic. Regarding a preference for decreasing sequences: uncertainty that the future
outcomes will occur, opportunity costs and pure time preference.
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measurement of time preferences involving hypothetical or actual money. Additionally, a
large body of empirical evidence supports the claim that people prefer increasing payments
of income. In particular, research has found that wages increase at a faster rate than pro-
ductivity.8 This would only seem to be the case when the worker has a preference for such
improvements. In another strand, researchers have found that happiness or satisfaction is
signicantly related to increases in wages.9 Based on the experimental and empirical work
cited above, we are reasonably condent in the applicability of the experiments which follow.
3 Study 1
3.1 Procedure
A total of 105 subjects, recruited from economics classes at Rutgers University-Camden, par-
ticipated in the experiment. Sessions were conducted in classes of 19, 50, 13, and 23. Subjects
were given course credit for attendance and were told that within each session, roughly 1 out
of 25 subjects would be randomly drawn to win a prize of $20 in cash.10 Instructions were
provided by the same male experimenter.11 The subjects were told to consider a hypothetical
employment setting. The study posed 5 income sequence questions and 4 hours sequence
questions which were recorded on paper.12
Before each income sequence question, the subjects were told that they "...are happy with
nonmonetary aspects of the job..." and are o¤ered the following options for payment over
time. Each income sequence question, o¤ered subjects six options for an income stream over
6 years. The subjects were told to select the one which they most prefer. In each of the
ve income questions, the subject was presented with a constant sequence of either $17; 000,
$37; 000, $57; 000, $77; 000, or $97; 000. The other response items within each question varied
8See Clark (1999), Flabbi and Ichino (2001), Frank and Hutchens (1993), Lazear (1999), Medo¤ and
Abraham (1980) and Smith (2009b).
9See Burchardt (2005), Di Tella et. al. (2007), Grund and Sliwka (2007), Inglehart and Rabier (1986) and
Senik (2008).
10Two payments were made in the large class, whereas only a single payment was made in the others.
11The delivery of the instructions was aided by Power Point slides. These slides are available from the author
upon request.
12The exact items are also available from the corresponding author upon request.
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the degree to which the payments are increasing. These increases were designed in a manner
that each response within each question summed to an identical amount. Therefore, any
subject who positively discounts would prefer the constant sequence of income, irrespective
of the amount. Each response had identical values in the third year, however the increasing
payments each had lower incomes in rst and second years and higher incomes in the fourth,
fth, and sixth years. This increase was linear therefore any income sequence was a mixture
between the most increasing sequence and the constant sequence. See the appendix for a
sample income question.
The response items were presented to the subjects either in decreasing or increasing fashion.
We recoded the responses so that Option 1 represents the constant sequence and Option 6
represents the most increasing sequence. As a result we are able to speak of a stronger
preference for increasing payments as being associated with a higher number because the
choice exhibited a lower present value.
In order to minimize the extrapolation e¤ect, each response item included the description
"same for each" for year 7 and beyond. Also in an e¤ort to minimize the extrapolation e¤ect,
the subjects were told that, at the end of the sixth year, they would either be promoted or
red and therefore their choice of income stream would not a¤ect their income after the sixth
year. The subjects were told that the dollar amounts were listed in 2009 dollars and that
their forecast of ination should not be factored into their responses.
After the income questions, the subjects were provided with a list of possible hours se-
quences over the next 6 years. In each of the four hours questions, the subject was presented
a constant amount of 40, 50, 60, or 70 hours per week. The other response items in each
question were increasing or decreasing step functions, with only a single step, which summed
to the same amount over the six years. Therefore, any subject who positively discounts would
never prefer a decreasing sequence of hours. As with the income questions, we varied the
order of the questions and the response items.
Finally the subjects were asked to provide their description of starting salaries of $17; 000,
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$37; 000, $57; 000, $77; 000, and $97; 000 on a scale of 1 (very low) to 7 (very high).
3.2 Data
To check the validity of the variation of the payments, note that 104 out of the 105 sub-
jects described the starting incomes of $17; 000, $37; 000, $57; 000, $77; 000 and $97; 000 in a
monotonic fashion. See Table 1 for the mean response to the description of a starting salary
of the various amounts, with the standard deviation in parenthesis.
$17; 000 $37; 000 $57; 000 $77; 000 $97; 000
1:624 3:510 4:743 5:724 6:629
(0:890) (0:883) (0:867) (0:826) (0:624)
Table 1: Mean responses (with standard deviation in parentheses) to descrip-
tion of starting salaries.
See Table 2 for the means and standard deviations of the option choices for each of the
income questions.
$17; 000 $37; 000 $57; 000 $77; 000 $97; 000
3:086 3:571 3:714 3:857 3:867
(2:085) (2:042) (2:027) (2:059) (1:976)
Table 2: Mean responses (with standard deviation in parentheses) of option
choice for each income question.
We run several regressions which support the claim that the preference for increasing
payments are increasing in the size of the wages o¤ered. Each regression species the degree
of the preference for increasing payments as the dependent variable. Regression 1 species
wage as the independent variable, regression 2 species the description of the payment as the
independent variable, regression 3 species both the description and the wage as independent
variables and regression 4 species description and description squared as the independent
variables. Each regression has n = 525. See Table 3 for a summary of the regressions.13
13 In this and the remaining set of regressions, because we are not interested in the intercepts, we do not list
them.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage 0:18    0:045  
(0:063) (0:14)
Description   0:16 0:188 0:54
(0:046) (0:102) (0:21)
Description squared        0:046
(0:025)
R2 0:016 0:022 0:023 0:029
Table 3: Regression results of option choice with * indicating signicance at
0.1 and *** indicating signicance at 0.01.
As can be seen in Table 3, each regression specication suggests a positive relationship
between the size of the wages or the perception of the wages.
Study 1 allows the analysis of the within subject relationship between the preference over
sequences of monetary outcomes and the preference over sequences of nonmonetary outcomes.
We nd that there is no relationship between the exhibition of a preference for increasing
payments and a preference for decreasing hours. A regression with the sum of the hours
choices as the independent variable and sum of the income choices as the dependent variable
demonstrates that there is no relationship between the two (p = 0:94). Therefore, it seems
that subjects exhibit di¤erent time preferences for income and required hours.
However, our subjects do exhibit a relationship between changes in the preference for
increasing income as income varies and changes in the preference for decreasing hours when
the required hours vary. Within the 5 income questions, there are 4 possibilities to have an
increase, decrease or no change in adjacent income questions ($17K to $37K, $37K to $57K,
$57K to $77K and $77K to $97K). Within the 4 hours questions, there are 3 possibilities
to have an increase, decrease or no change in adjacent hours questions (40 hours to 50 hours,
50 hours to 60 hours, 60 hours to 70 hours).
We perform a regression where the number of instances in which the there is an increase
in the option chosen in adjacent income questions is the independent variable and the number
of instances in which there is a decrease in the option chosen in adjacent hours questions is
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the dependent variable. In this regression, the estimated coe¢ cient is positive (0:104; s:e:
0:0577) and almost signicant (t = 1:80; p = 0:074). We perform another regression in which
the number of instances in which there is a constant response in adjacent income questions is
the independent variable and the number of instances in which there is a constant response in
adjacent hours questions is the dependent variable. In this regression, the estimated coe¢ cient
is positive (0:163; s:e: 0:0673) and signicant (t = 2:43; p = 0:017). Therefore, we conclude
that the study provides evidence that within subjects, there is a relationship between changes
in the preference for increasing payments as income varies and the preference for decreasing
hours as the amount of hours varies.
3.3 Discussion
Study 1 found a positive relationship between the preference for increasing payments and the
size of those payments. Additionally, the study demonstrated a link between preferences for
improving sequences involving monetary and nonmonetary outcomes. A drawback of Study 1
is that there was no baseline measure of the preference for sequences of nonwage money with
which to compare the preference for sequences of income.
4 Study 2
4.1 Procedure
A total of 212 undergraduate and graduate students in the psychology subject pool at Rutgers
University-Camden were recruited to participate in the experiment. The subjects were given
course credit for participating but were not paid. The same male experimenter administered
the items and answered any possible questions. The responses were recorded on paper.
Subjects were randomly selected to be in one of two treatments: the wage treatment or
the lotto treatment. Subjects in the wage treatment were given exactly the same 5 income
questions as those in Study 1. In the lotto treatment, the nancial amounts were identical to
that in the wage treatment, however the description of the source of the money was di¤erent.
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Lotto treatment subjects were told that a relative won a substantial lotto jackpot and o¤ered
the following streams of money. Therefore, the only di¤erence between the two treatments is
the description of the source of the payments. The lotto treatment had 108 subjects and the
job treatment had 104 subjects.
As in Study 1, we varied the order of the questions and the order of the response items.
However, we recoded the responses so that Option 1 represents the constant sequence and
Option 6 represents the most increasing sequence. As a result we are able to speak of a
stronger preference for increasing payments as being associated with a higher number. Also
as in Study 1, we asked subjects to provide their description of starting salaries of $17K, $37K,
$57K, $77K and $97K on a scale of 1 (very low) to 7 (very high).
4.2 Data
To check the validity of the variation of the payments, note that 209 out of the 212 subjects
described the starting incomes of $17K, $37K, $57K, $77K and $97K in a monotonic fashion.
To demonstrate the relationship between the wage and the preference for increasing payments,
we run the following regressions. Each regression species the degree of the preference for
increasing payments as the dependent variable and the wage as the independent variable. Re-
gression 1 involves the job treatment, regression 2 involves the lotto treatment,and regression
3 pools the lotto and job treatments. See Table 4 for the results of the regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
Wage 0:122 0:119 0:121
(0:065) (0:066) (0:047)
R2 0:0068 0:0060 0:0063
n 520 540 1060
Table 4: Regression results of option choice with * indicating signicance at
0.1 and *** indicating signicance at 0.01.
As can be seen in Table 4, each regression specication suggests a positive relationship
between the size of the wages.
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We now compare the Lotto and Job treatments. See Figure 1 which displays the mean
choice by the payment size and payment treatment.
3
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Figure 1: Mean preference for increasing payments by payment size and payment treatment.
Consistent with Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) the preference for increasing sequences of
payments is larger for sequences described as income payments from a job rather than income
payments from some other source. The question then becomes, what is the relationship
between these di¤erences and the size of the payments. In order to determine this relationship,
we perform a t-test between the Lotto and Job treatments for each of the 5 income questions.
The t-tests within each of the question types across treatments are as follows with means and
standard deviations listed.14
$17; 000 $37; 000 $57; 000 $77; 000 $97; 000
Lotto 3:20 3:23 3:19 3:52 3:66
(2:29) (2:18) (2:12) (2:17) (2:20)
Job 3:64 3:70 3:84 4:02 4:10
(2:16) (2:09) (2:11) (2:07) (2:06)
t  statistic  1:44  1:61  2:21  1:72  1:50
p  value 0:075 0:055 0:014 0:043 0:067
Table 5: t-test results across treatments with means (and standard deviations
in parentheses).
14Each test has 210 degrees of freedom. The p-values listed are for a one-sided test.
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Note that Table 5 demonstrates that the Lotto treatment and Job treatment are signif-
icantly di¤erent for intermediate payments but not signicantly di¤erent for large or small
payments.
4.3 Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide support for the predictions of Smith (2009a). Roughly, Smith
argues that increasing payments for wage income can reduce the perceived cost of e¤ort from
work. For payments which are very likely or very unlikely to cover the cost of e¤ort, the
benet of such a reduction is minimal. However, for payments which are neither likely nor
unlikely to cover the cost of e¤ort, there could be a signicant benet from such a reduction.
Therefore, Smith (2009a) predicts that the preference for increasing payments will be largest
for intermediate payments. Indeed this is what is found in Study 2.
Other than a mechanism similar to that proposed in Smith (2009a), it is di¢ cult to see
how this nonmonotonic relationship could arise. Early explanations of the di¤erence between
the preference for increasing sequences of wages and the preference for increasing sequences
of nonwage money related to a feeling of mastery which accompanies succeeding at a job.15
This is likely to be an important reason to value increasing sequences of wages however it is
di¢ cult to see how this explanation is consistent with the results of Study 2.
A possible explanation for the relationship between the degree of the preference for in-
creasing payments and the size of the payments is that it is due to decreasing marginal utility.
In order to test this possible explanation, we also measure the shape of the utility for money
in the following study.
15Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991).
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5 Study 3
5.1 Proecdure
A total of 230 Rutgers-Camden law students completed our survey.16 The items were admin-
istered online via Surveymonkey.com. An email notication was sent to each law student,
which invited them to participate in the survey. The subjects were told that, upon completion
of the survey, they would be entered into a lottery for a $50 prize, where one prize would be
given for every 50 subjects who complete the survey.17
The post law school job market is characterized by two distinct employment types.18
We characterize these two types as "Big Firm" and "Small Firm/Public Interest." When
compared to the latter, the former is characterized by longer hours, higher pay, and little
control over caseload. The students are asked for their plans after law school: Denitely
Big Firm, Probably Big Firm, Possibly Big Firm, I dont Know, Possibly Small Firm/Public
Interest, Probably Small Firm/Public Interest, or Denitely Small Firm/Public Interest. This
would allow the subject to be directed to the appropriate income questions and job description.
Like Study 1, each income question o¤ers subjects 6 options regarding identical amounts
of income streams which vary in their rate of increase and hence in their present discounted
value. As is more standard in the legal profession, we o¤er the payments over 7 years. We
told the subjects that at the end of the 7th year, they will either be red or promoted hence
their choice will have no a¤ect on income after the 7th year.
In an e¤ort to hold perceived cost of e¤ort constant, while we varied income levels, we
provided an employment description for both the Big Firm subjects and the Small Firm/Public
Interest subjects. Additionally we selected the income levels in order to include values which
would be considered to range from very low to very high. The Small Firm subjects were
told, "You work 50 hours per week or less. You have control over your caseload. The job is
16A total of 279 surveys were submitted however only 239 were completed and were unique. We additionally
excluded 9 surveys because they were not completed within one hour.
17We made 5 payments of $50.
18National Association for Legal Career Professionals (2008).
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relatively stress-free and you have a good work-life balance." Then, as in Study 1, we varied
the income levels of $28; 000, $48; 000, $68; 000, $88; 000, $108; 000 and $128; 000. The Big
Firm subjects were told, "You work an excess of 80 hours per week. You have no control
over your caseload. The job is relatively stressful and you do not have a good work-life
balance." We varied the income levels of $58; 000, $88; 000, $118; 000, $148; 000, $178; 000
and $208; 000. We randomly19 determined whether the income questions were asked in an
increasing or decreasing order. The response items were automatically randomized by the
survey tool. The subjects were then asked to provide the description of the relevant starting
salaries on a scale of 1 (very low) to 7 (very high).
Next the subjects were presented with a modied Eckel and Grossman (2008) measure of
risk aversion. The item was posed as a choice of bonus structure, whereby the subject could
not control the likelihood of obtaining the bonus, and that such a choice would not a¤ect
future payments. The choices were: $70; 000 for sure, $68; 000 with 50% and $74; 000 with
50%, $64; 000 with 50% and $82; 000 with 50%, $60; 000 with 50% and $90; 000 with 50%,
$54; 000 with 50% and $102; 000 with 50%, $44; 000 with 50% and $122; 000 with 50%. The
Big Firm subjects were presented with the identical options, with the exception that each
value was but multiplied by 2. As in the original Eckel and Grossman measure, the response
items as listed above are increasing in both risk and expected value. Further, a choice among
the options provides a measure of the shape of their utility for money.
Finally, the subjects were o¤ered the hours questions as in Study 1, with the exception
that the required hours were specied over 7 rather than 6 years.
5.2 Data
First, as with the two studies above, the preference for increasing payments is related to the
size of the payments. We run a regression between the rank of the income question as the
19Survey Monkey does not o¤er a randomization of the question order however this randomization was
accomplished by asking for the nal digit of the subjects date of birth. Odd numbered dates were directed
to a sequence of questions which decreased in the income levels and even numbered dates were directed to
increasing questions.
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independent variable and the income choice as the dependent variable, such that n = 1360.
The coe¢ cient on the rank of the income question is positive (0:20, s:e:0:031) and signicant
(t = 6:29, p < 0:001).
We run 6 regressions in order to better understand the relationship between the preference
for increasing payments and the size of the payments. To do so we examine the role of prefer-
ences for improving sequences of nonmonetary domains and the shape of the utility curve as
measured by the choice of bonus structure. In regressions (1) - (3) the dependent variable is
the number of instances of constant responses to adjacent income questions. Regression (1)
uses the number of instances of constant responses to adjacent hours questions as the inde-
pendent variable. Regression (2) uses the response to the bonus question as the independent
variable. Regression (3) uses both variables. In regressions (4) - (6) the dependent variable
is the number of instances of increasing responses to adjacent income questions. Regression
(4) uses the number of instances of decreasing responses to hours questions as the independent
variable. Regression (5) uses the response to the bonus question as the independent variable.
Regression (6) uses both variables. Each regression has n = 230.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours 0:041   0:045  0:089    0:075
(0:11) (0:11) (0:18) (0:18)
Bonus   0:091 0:092   0:091 0:090
(0:068) (0:068) (0:068) (0:068)
R2 0:00059 0:0079 0:0086 0:0010 0:0079 0:0086
Table 6: Regression results of option choice. Regressions (1) - (3) have the
number of instances of constant responses to adjacent income questions as the
dependent variable. We use instances of constant responses to adjacent hours
questions as the independent variable in regressions (1) and (3). Regressions
(4) - (6) have the number of instances of increasing responses to adjacent income
questions as the dependent variable. We use the instances of number of instances of
decreasing responses to hours questions as the independent variable in regressions
(4) and (6).
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Note that in each of the six regressions, none of the variables reach a level of signicance.
Therefore, we conclude that the shape of the utility curve is not responsible for the relationship
between the preference for increasing payments and the size of the payments.
5.3 Discussion
A natural explanation for the relationship between the preference for increasing payments
and the size of the payments is that people tend to exhibit decreasing marginal utility of
money. However, for this explanation to hold, the relationship must vary with the shape
of the subjects utility for money. We measured the shape of the utility of money using
a technique adapted from Eckel and Grossman (2008). We do not nd evidence that our
measure of the shape of utility for money is associated with the relationship between the
preference for increasing payments and the size of the payments.
Study 3 also nds that, unlike Study 1, the preference for declining hours required for a job
is not related to the preference for increasing wages. This mixed evidence regarding the role
the preference for improving sequences across di¤erent domains is consistent with evidence.
In our study, we speculate that the law students in Study 3 are aware that explicitly o¤ering
a declining sequence of required hours is not common. As a result, perhaps they discount
the possibility. By contrast, the undergraduate students in Study 1 are perhaps not aware of
this fact and therefore we nd a relationship across domains.
6 Conclusion
Although prior research has found that people often exhibit a preference for increasing pay-
ments, little is known about how these preferences vary with the size of the payments. We
contribute to the existing research by nding evidence that the degree of the preference for
increasing payments is increasing in the size of the payments. Indeed, we nd this in each of
our studies, despite the di¤erences in the subject populations.
Although the relationship between the preference for increasing payments and the size of
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the payments seems to be robust, our research sheds light on potential explanations: we nd
evidence against the explanation of decreasing marginal utility. In particular, we measure of
the shape of the utility for money and nd that it is not related to the nding.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature by nding experimental evidence supporting
the theoretical prediction of Smith (2009a). We nd evidence that the preference for increasing
sequences of income is strongest for income which is neither likely nor unlikely to cover the cost
of e¤ort. As people tend to exhibit a stronger preference for money when the payments are
described as wages as opposed to nonwage money, we take a baseline measure of preference for
increasing sequences of nonwage money. We nd that the di¤erence between the preference
for increasing income and the preference for increasing payments of nonwage money is largest
for intermediate values.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present study. First, before we completely
rule out the marginal utility explanation, it is worth considering our measure of the utility
curve. Perhaps behavior in our adaptation of the Eckel and Grossman (2008) measure is
unreliable for the large amounts which we employ. Secondly, choice in our experiment is
not incentive compatible. It is perhaps worthwhile to look for empirical data which could
potentially falsify the experimental studies presented here.
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8 Appendix
Below is a sample income question from Study 1.
To better understand your preferences for your future career, we will ask a series of ques-
tions.
There are no correct answers, so please answer as honestly as possible.
You are reasonable happy with the nonmonetary aspects of the job and you are o¤ered
the following payment schedules over the next 6 years.
Specically, you are given 6 options (Option 1,. . . , Option 6) which species an amount of
income for each of the following 6 years.
At the end of 6 years, you will either be promoted to a higher position or you will be red.
Therefore your choice of payment will have no bearing on your income at the end of the six
years.
**Note all amounts are listed in 2009 dollars therefore your answer should not reect your
beliefs about future ination.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 and Beyond
Option 1 $37,000 $37,000 $37,000 $37,000 $37,000 $37,000 Same for each
Option 2 $35,890 $36,260 $37,000 $37,370 $37,555 $37,925 Same for each
Option 3 $34,780 $35,520 $37,000 $37,740 $38,110 $38,850 Same for each
Option 4 $33,670 $34,780 $37,000 $38,110 $38,665 $39,775 Same for each
Option 5 $32,560 $34,040 $37,000 $38,480 $39,220 $40,700 Same for each
Option 6 $31,450 $33,300 $37,000 $38,850 $39,775 $41,625 Same for each
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Below is a sample income question from the Small Firm/Public Interest series in Study 3.
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